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International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
American workers, and women in particular, have been the focus
of a great deal of protective legislation during the last three decades.
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.2 Among its
other provisions, Title VII prohibits employers from excluding women
from jobs on the basis of sex.3 In 1970, Congress passed the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act (OSHA),4 which requires that employers
protect workers from recognized hazards by making the work environ-
ment safe.5 In 1978, Congress added the Pregnancy Amendment6 to
Title VII, which classified restrictions on employment based upon
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions as sex discrimina-
1. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
5. OSHA's General Duty Clause requires the employer to provide to "each
of his employees a place of employment which is free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees." Id. § 654(a)(1).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
1
Auman: Auman: Excluding Women from the Workplace
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
tion.7 One of the reasons for this vast amount of legislation is the rate
at which women have been entering the job market. "Today women
represent 45 percent of all working Americans"8 and by the year 2000
it is estimated "women will comprise 47 percent of our work force."9
This means that by the year 2000, eighty-one percent of American
women will be working outside the home.'
0
With this increase in the number of women workers has come an
increasing awareness of, and concern about, reproductive hazards"
which accompany exposure to many chemicals 12 found in the work-
place. In response to the effects of these hazardous chemicals on the
reproductive capabilities of employees, many companies have instituted
policies which exclude women from any jobs that appear hazardous to
7. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act reads as follows:
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefits programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work.
Id.
8. United States Department of Labor, WEEKLY NEWSPAPER SERVICE, Nov.
20, 1989, at 1.
9. Id.
10. Department of Labor Report, 54 Fed. Reg. 37,035 (1989).
11. Finneran, Title VII and Restrictions on Employment of Fertile Women,
31 LAB. L.J. 223 (1980); Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace:
Implications for the Employment Rights of Women, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 798
(1981); Williams, Firing the Woman td Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of
Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEo.
L.J. 641 (1981).
12. These chemicals can be classified according to their effect on human
reproductive processes. Mutagens can alter the genetic structure of reproductive
cells in both males and females; such alterations can result in birth defects that
may be passed on to future generations. Gametotoxins can limit the fertility of
either sex by reducing or damaging the sperm and ova. Teratogens damage the
fetus directly by passing through the mother's placenta; damage may occur
before the mother is even aware that she is pregnant. Certain substances may
have mutagenic, gametotoxic, and teratogenic characteristics. Only if a toxin
can be classified exclusively as a teratogen will the threat of reproductive harm
be limited to women. Note, Employment Discrimination-Wright v. Olin Corp.:
Title VII and the Exclusion of Women from the Fetally Toxic Workplace, 62
N.C.L. REv. 1068, 1068 n.3 (1984) (citing Howard, Hazardous Substances in the
Workplace: Implications for the Employment Rights of Women, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 798, 802-06 (1981)).
-772 [Vol. 55
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the fetus.'" Male employees are also at risk for future reproductive
dysfunctions, such as sperm malformation and a risk of producing a
malformed child when exposed to hazardous chemicals. 14 Employers
do not, however, typically apply these same policies to exclude men from
such jobs.' 5
13. See Note, Title WI-Employment Discrimination and Fetal Safety in
Hazardous Work Environments-Wright, et al. v. Olin Corp., 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
211, 212 n.8 in which the author lists employers and substances that have been
the subject of exclusionary employment policies:
American Cyanamid excluded women of childbearing age from jobs
involving exposure to the following substances the company consid-
ered harmful to fetuses: lead and mercury and their compounds,
benzene, vinyl chloride, acrylamide, carbon disulfide, carbon monox-
ide, carbon tetrachloride, dimethyl sulfate, and cyanide, and excluded
women of childbearing age from jobs involving exposure to the
substances. Olin Corporation excluded women from its ammunition
plants, where benzene was used as a solvent. Benzene is one of the
top twelve chemicals by volume used by U.S. industry. It is produced
in the petroleum refining and petrochemical industries and used in
the manufacture of tires, nylons, pesticides, adhesives, laminates,
coatings, inks, paints, varnishes, moldings, and as an octane booster
in gasoline.
1d.
B.F. Goodrich excluded women from vinyl chloride exposure (a chemical
essential to the production of plastics). Id. Other companies with such
exclusionary policies include: General Motors, Allied Chemical, Eastman Kodak;
Firestone Tire & Rubber, and Goodyear. Id. (citing Williams, Firing the Woman
to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment
Opportunity Goals Under Title VI, 69 GEo. L.J. 641, 641-48 (1981)).
14. A federal regulation states:
In male workers exposed to lead there can be... decreased ability to
produce healthy sperm and sterility .... Malformed sperm (terato-
spermia), decreased number of sperm (hypospermia), and sperm with
decreased motility (asthenospermia) can all occur.
Germ cells can be affected by lead and cause genetic damage in the
egg or sperm cells before conception and result in failure to implant,
miscarriage, stillbirth, or birth defects.
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025, App. C(II)(5) (1989); see Howard, supra note 11, at 803-
05. "Abnormal numbers of chromosomal aberrations in males who work with
vinyl chloride lead medical experts to conclude that occupational exposure
causes germ cell damage in the father." Id. at 804.
15. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 11, at 803-06; Williams, supra note 11, at
657 & nn.102-03; see also Interpretive Guidelines on Employment Discrimina-
tion and Reproductive Hazards, 45 Fed. Reg. 7514, 7515 (1980) (proposed Feb.
1, 1980), withdrawn, 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 (1981) (arguing that employers do not
display the same concern for the reproductive hazards men may encounter)
1990]
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Employers argue that the prospect of the employer's causing fetal
harm is a legitimate basis for excluding women from certain jobs.
10
This argument rests both on the employer's fear of potential tort
liability to the harmed infant and on moral grounds.'
7
All workers, both men and women, potentially are exposed to
hundreds, if not thousands, of different toxic chemicals each year.'8 In
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,'9 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy
which excluded all women with childbearing capability from the
workplace because of the toxicity of lead. This case represents one
business' response to the potential health risks to workers. If other
employers decide to follow Johnson Controls' precedent and establish
programs barring women from jobs which may endanger the fetus, the
consequences could seriously threaten women's equal opportunity
rights. °
This Note first discusses the facts of Johnson Controls and the legal
background relating to the conflict between the employer's rights and
duties and a woman's right to be free of discrimination. It then
analyzes the Seventh Circuit's decision in light of Title VII 21 and the
Pregnancy Amendment 22 mandates and decisions made previously by
other circuits. Finally, it discusses the possible impact that the decision
may have upon women's work decisions in the future.
[hereinafter Interpretive Guidelines].
16. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1219 (1986).
17. Id. Employers stress that they have no way to protect themselves from
tort liability, because a woman cannot waive the rights of her unborn children.
However, if the employer fully informs the woman of the danger and she
continues to work in that area, the employer has not acted in a negligent
manner and therefore there does not appear to be a basis for tort liability. Id.
at 1244.
18. Many different agencies have compiled lists of substances which they
consider to be hazardous. See, e.g., Department of Transportation, 49 C.F.R. §
172.101 (1989) (listing over 2,000 substances); Environmental Protection Agency,
40 C.F.R. § 261.30-.33 (1989); Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (1989) (listing over 350 toxic substances).
19. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1552 (1990).
20. It has been estimated that fetal protection policies may effect nearly
"20,000,000 jobs in the United States." Interpretive Guidelines, supra note 15,
at 7514; see also Note, The Fetus As Business Customer In The Toxic Workplace:
Wright v. Olin Corp. Sets Standards For Fetal Protection Programs, 1984 DET.
C.L. REv. 973, 977.
21. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
22. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 55
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II. FACTUAL SUMMARY
In 1982 Johnson Controls adopted a fetal protection policy that
excluded "women with childbearing capacity"23 from initial employment
or transfer into jobs in which lead levels exceeded OSHA specifica-
tions. ' This policy applied only to Johnson Controls' Battery Division
and was established in an effort to prevent fetal exposure to lead, a
component of batteries and a substance known to cause fetal harm.
25
Because the manufacturing of batteries requires the use, of lead,
Johnson Controls, and its predecessor Globe Union, had initiated a large
number of innovative programs in an attempt to control and regulate all
employee's exposure to lead. Even with these protective programs,
however, the exposure to lead could not be reduced to acceptable levels
for women who may become pregnant.' The most recent medical
evidence established that lead exposure in utero presented a substantial
health risk t6 the unborn child.
2 7
Prior to adopting its fetal protection policy, the manufacturer
considered alternatives to the exclusion of women with childbearing
capacity from high lead exposure positions, but found no alternatives
that would adequately protect the uiborn child from the risks associated
with excessive lead exposure.' The manufacturer's experience showed
23. The fetal protection policy defines women of childbearing capacity as:
"all women except those whose inability to bear children is medically document-
ed." Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 876 n.8.
24. Id OSHA has established standards for employee exposure to lead.
The agency has stated that in order to prevent adverse effects the worker should
not have a blood lead level of greater than 40 micro-grams per 100 grams. If the
worker, male or female, plans to become a parent in the near future, the level
should remain below 30 micro-grams per 100 grams. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025,
App. C(II) (1989).
"While OSHA blood lead regulations utilized the measure of micro-grams
per 100 grams and Johnson controls' standard uses the measure of micro-grams
per deciliter, the parties have treated these measures as equivalent and [the
court will] treat them [as equivalent]." Id. at 876 n.7.
In response to the exclusionary policy Judge Posner, dissenting, stated that
the policy meant that "no fertile woman can be hired for a job in which any
employee has had a blood lead level exceeding 30 micro-grams per deciliter
anytime during the last year, or in any job that might lead to a promotion to
such a job." Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 919 (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge
Posner also noted that hiring offices were advised to inform women that "we
have no openings for women capable of bearing children." Id
25. Id. at 875-76.
26. Id at 875.
27. Id. at 880.
28. Id at 878.
1990]
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that the voluntary exclusion program was ineffective in that six
employees became pregnant while working in the high lead areas.2
In Johnson Controls, several UAW local unions and a group of
individual employees brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, alleging that this policy violated
Title VII.3  The district court granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment, and the unions and employees appealed. 1
Following a hearing and then a rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judg-
ment.32 The court upheld the fetal protection policy because it relied
on scientific data indicating that risk of harm to a fetus was confined
primarily to women, there was no less discriminatory alternative, and
the policy was reasonably necessary to industrial safety. The court
believed that based upon the facts of this case, the fetal protection policy
could be upheld legally under both the business necessity defense 33 and
under the bona fide occupational qualification defense.
4
Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Seventh Circuit, in Johnson Controls, is not the first federal
appellate court to deal with a case involving the conflict between a
woman's right to choose her employment and an employer's right to
exclude the woman to protect the unborn child.35 When Congress
29. Id. at 876-77. Judge Posner's dissenting opinion stated that eight
women became pregnant while working in high lead exposure positions. Id at
913.
30. Id. at 874.
31. Id
32. Id. at 874-75.
33. The business necessity defense is a judicially created defense to Title VII
claims. The defense requires that the employer show that a challenged facially
neutral job criteria that adversely effects a protected class has a relationship to
actual job performance. See infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
34. The bona fide occupational qualification is a statutory exception to Title
VII which is allowed if the employer shows that its business would be
undermined if not allowed to hire only one sex. See infra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text.
35. Several courts have dealt with this issue. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby
Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984) (woman x-ray technician
discharged when she became pregnant); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172
(4th Cir. 1982) (company policy excluding women from all jobs with exposure to
known or suspected abortifacient or teratogenic agents); Zuniga v. Kleberg
County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (woman x-ray technician discharged
when she became pregnant); Doerr v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 484 F. Supp. 320 (N.D.
Ohio 1979) (company policy excluded women from jobs involving exposure to
[Vol. 55
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enacted the Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII in 1978,3 it expressly
protected women's employment rights against discrimination based upon
"pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."3 7 Nevertheless,
employers have continued to develop fetal protection policies which work
to exclude women from certain jobs.'
The Supreme Court has recognized two theories under which Title
VII claimants may attempt to prove employment discrimination:
disparate treatment,3 9 and disparate impact.4 ° Under each theory
"the ultimate burden of proving that discrimination against a protected
group has been caused by a specific employment practice remains with
the plaintiff at all times."'
1
Disparate treatment occurs when an employer adopts a practice
that classifies an employee on a basis not actually prohibited by Title
VII, which the employee alleges is merely a pretense raised to hide
unlawful discrimination.42 Disparate treatment occurs in two ways.
First, a prima facie case of discrimination can be shown by mere proof
of the existence of a policy or practice that treats a "protected class
"43
of employees or would-be employees less favorably than workers not
within the class.44 A second way of establishing disparate treatment
is by inference that the employer intended to treat the employees less
favorably because of their sex, race, age, or other protected status.
45
vinyl chloride).
36. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
38. See, e.g., Timko, Exploring the Limits of Legal Duty: A Union's
Responsibilities With Respect To Fetal Protection Policies, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
159 (1986).
39. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-02 (1973).
40. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
41. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
42. See, e.g, McDonnellDouglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 794-96 (employer refusal
to rehire black employee because of past criminal conduct may be pretext for
race discrimination).
43. In the instant case, the protected class was all fertile women.
44. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
704 (1978) (policy requiring larger contributions from female employees than
male employees into the employer's pension fund, simply because women as a
class live longer, is a violation of Title VII).
45. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme
Court set forth the following requirements necessary for the plaintiff to establish
a prima facie claim of disparate treatment through inference:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
1990]
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Once established, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut by showing
a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for the exclusion.4" If the
employer can meet this burden, the claimant must then prove that the
reason given by the employer is a mere pretext for discriminatory
intent.
47
Title VII expressly provides an employer only one exception to the
general rule in cases involving this overt discrimination. The exception
arises when religion, sex, or national origin is a "bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [the]
particular business or enterprise."4  The bona fide occupational
qualification defense (BFOQ) is a statutory exception to Title VII.49
The BFOQ defense allows an employer to hire individuals from only one
sex providing the employer can show "the essence of the business
operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex
exclusively."'r'  The Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson,61
interpreted this exception narrowly, stating "an employer [can] rely on
the bfoq exception only by proving 'that he had reasonable cause to
believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the
job involved."'52
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802.
46. Id
47. 1I at 804. Proof of discriminatory motive is necessary in order to find
an employer guilty of disparate treatment. Id
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees.., on the basis of his religion, sex, or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex or national origin
is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise ....
Id-
49. The BFOQ defense is established at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e):
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subchapter, (1) it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employee employees.., on the basis of his religion, sex, or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin
in a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise ....
Id.
50. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (quoting Diaz v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)).
51. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
52. Id at 333 (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228,
[Vol. 55
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Under the disparate impact theory, an employer violates Title VII
by adopting a facially neutral policy that does not differentiate on the
basis of a particular class, but nonetheless has a disproportionate,
adverse effect on a class protected by Title VII.53  Although such
practices are not intentionally discriminatory, they act to perpetuate the
effects of discrimination and are therefore invalid under Title VII. The
Supreme Court first considered disparate impact analysis in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,' which extended Title VII to cover practices which
are "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. ,5 5 In Nashville Gas
Co. v. Satty,' the Court found that despite the facial neutrality of the
employer's policy, which allowed both male and female employees to
retain their accumulated seniority while on leave for nonoccupational
disabilities other than pregnancy, it deprived women employees of
employment opportunities and acted to "adversely affect [their] status
as an employee" due to their sex.
57
Although disparate treatment and disparate impact appear much
the same, a charge of disparate treatment requires consideration of
intent, while a charge of disparate impact requires the court to look at
the consequences of a facially neutral policy.
58
235 (5th Cir. 1969)) (emphasis added).
53. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587
(1979) (policy of not hiring methadone users is not a prima facie violation of
Title VII because disproportionate numbers of blacks and Hispanics are excluded
from consideration).
54. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, black employees challenged the
employer's requirement that employees possess a high school diploma or obtain
satisfactory scores on standardized intelligence tests. The employees claimed
that neither requirement was significantly related to job performance and
operated disproportionately against blacks. I& at 428.
55. Id. at 431.
56. 434 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1977) (the Court found disparate treatment when
the employer required pregnant employees to take a leave of absence during
which the employee received no sick pay, even though other employees received
sick pay and the pregnant employee lost all accumulated seniority while other
employees did not).
57. Id. at 140 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1970 & Supp. V)). The
court ruled that the exclusion of pregnancy from the general leave of absence
provisions was a "pretextf designed to effect an invidious discrimination against
the members of one sex." Id. at 145 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 135 (1976) (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974))).
58. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971) ("[G]ood intent
or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment proce-
dures.., that operate as 'built in headwinds' for minority groups... Congress
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In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,59 the Supreme Court created the
business necessity defense.' This judicially created defense provides
the defendant employer with a defense to Title VII claims of disparate
impact discrimination. The defense requires that the employer show
that the challenged neutral job criteria has a manifest relationship to
actual job performance. The Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawl-
inson,6" expanded the job-relatedness concept when it stated "a
discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be necessary to
safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge."0 2
This expanded concept seems to uphold other court decisions which have
held that if the employer can show that, although there is an adverse
impact upon a protected group, its program relates to an "overriding
legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the
safe and efficient operation of the business""3 it will not violate Title
VII.
Recently, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,64 the Supreme
Court stated that "at the justification stage... [of a business necessity
defense] the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves,
in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employ-
er. 65 Once the employer demonstrates a reasonable business necessi-
ty, the complainant may then rebut by proving that other options exist
which would reasonably meet the employers goals without the objection-
able discriminatory effect.6
The legislative history of the pregnancy amendment to Title VII
shows that Congress intended for the employer to use the BFOQ defense
only in cases where the discrimination is related to childbearing
capabilities.6 7 During discussion on the amendment, Senator Williams,
59. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
60. "The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude [protected class] cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431.
61. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
62. Id. at 332 n.14.
63. Robinsonv. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
64. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
65. Id. at 2125-26.
66. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Wards Cove
Packing Co., 109 S. Ct. at 2126-27 ("If [plaintiffs] ... come forward with
alternatives to [the employers] hiring practices that reduce the... impact of
practices currently being used, and [the employers] refuse to adopt these
alternatives, such a refusal would belie a claim by [plaintiffs] that their
incumbent practices are being employed for nondiscriminatory reasons.")
67. "The amendment renders any policies based on or related to pregnancy
'subject to the same scrutiny on the same terms as other acts of sex discrhnina-
780 [Vol. 5
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one of the bill's sponsors, stated "the overall effect of discrimination
against women because they might become pregnant, or do become
pregnant, is to relegate women in general, and pregnant women in
particular, to a second-class status with regard to career advancement
and continuity of employment and wages." Although it appears that
a fetal protection program is overtly discriminatory, in that it affects
only women on the basis of the ability to have children, and thus should
be decided upon the employer's ability to use the BFOQ defense, these
cases typically have been decided using the disparate impact analy-
sis.69
The three most recent cases which deal with fetal vulnerability
considerations are Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital,70 Wright v. Olin
Corp.,7' and Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hospital.72 Each of these cases
applied the disparate impact/business necessity analysis in determining
whether the policy to exclude women from certain jobs was valid. This
analysis was used although the policies challenged were clearly overtly
discriminatory. In Zuniga, the Fifth Circuit considered the hospital's
argument that the business necessity defense applied based upon the
potential harm to the fetus from radiation exposure, and the potential
future liability that the hospital could encounter. 3 The court noted
that although the Supreme Court in Dothard had only implied that the
business necessity defense extends beyond job-relatedness, the Fourth
Circuit in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,74 indicated that the scope of the
tion proscribed in the existing statute."' Note, supra note 12, at 1081 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMiN. NEWS 4749, 4752).
68. 123 CoNG. REC. 29,385 (1977). For a comprehensive review of the
legislative history of the Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII, see Note, supra
note 12, at 1068-82.
69. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 732 F.2d 944 (1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir.
1982); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982).
70. 726 F.2d at 1546, reh'g denied, 732 F.2d 944 (1984) (hospital terminated
a pregnant woman's employment immediately after she informed her supervisor
that she was pregnant).
71. 697 F.2d at 1182 (fetal vulnerability program excluded women from
certain jobs).
72. 692 F.2d at 988 (x-ray technician was forced to resign when she became
pregnant).
73. Id. at 991.
74. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (class
action under Title VII which challenged a racially discriminatory seniority
system). In Robinson, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the business necessity
defense to include safety and efficiency of the business operation when it stated:
1990]
11
Auman: Auman: Excluding Women from the Workplace
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
defense may be larger.7 5 The Zuniga Court recognized that a link does
exist between the economic consequences of legal actions and the
Robinson standard of "safe and efficient operation of the business."70
The court decided that even if the defense did extend to the protection
of fetuses from harm and avoidance of liability, the hospital's failure to
consider other available alternatives would rebut the defense.
77
In Wright, the Fourth Circuit considered the employer's defense of
its exclusionary policy. The employer sought to defend its fetal
vulnerability program which restricted any fertile woman from working
in a job which "may require contact with and exposure to known or
suspected abortifacient or teratogenic agents,"78 by using the business
necessity defense. Olin claimed that the exclusionary program was
necessary in order to protect the fetus from exposure to toxic chemicals
used in the manufacturing process. In determining whether the
business necessity defense applied to the fetal vulnerability program,
despite the adverse impact upon female employees, the court concentrat-
ed on whether fetal protection justified such an employment practice.79
The Court reasoned that societal interests, reflected in laws requiring
the employer to protect the health of employees and their families, could
provide a basis for the business necessity defense.
8 0
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business
purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be
sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged
practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged
to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies
or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose
advanced or accomplish it equally well with lesser differential racial
impact.
Id at 798 (footnotes omitted).
75. Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 991-92; see supra notes 59-66 and accompanying
text.
76. Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 992 n.10 (quoting Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798).
"[T]he economic consequences of a tort suit brought against the Hospital by a
congenitally malformed child could be financially devastating, seriously
disrupting the 'safe and efficient operation of the business."' Id
77. Id at 992.
78. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1182.
79. Id at 1188.
80. Id at 1189-90, 1190 n.26. The court cited: Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1985); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§
301-392 (1982), as examples of national laws requiring employers to protect the
health of employees and their families. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1190 n.26.
[Vol. 55
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Recognizing that on its face the fetal protection policy looked
overtly discriminatory, the court decided to treat the policy as facially
neutral in order to allow the employer to use the business necessity
defense. The court then defined the defense as requiring satisfaction of
the following two elements, in the context of a fetal protection policy:
"(1) that there is a substantial risk of harm to the fetus or potential
offspring of women employees from the women's exposure, either during
pregnancy or while fertile, to toxic hazards in the workplace and (2) that
the hazard applies to fertile or pregnant women, but not to men."
81
Providing these two elements were present, the employer could use
the business necessity defense. The Court held that "under appropriate
circumstances an employer may, as a matter of business necessity,
impose otherwise impermissible restrictions... that are reasonably
required to protect the health of unborn children of women workers
against hazards of the workplace."
8 2
In Hayes, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the case under the
disparate impact theory using the elements outlined by the Fourth
CircuitP3 to establish that the involved policy was facially neutral and
not overtly discriminatory.' The theory underlying the facial neutrali-
ty analysis utilized is that a policy meeting the above criteria "is neutral
in the sense that it effectively and equally protects the offspring of all
employees."8
5
Without the use of this analysis, the employer would be required to
use the traditional overt discrimination analysis and the bona fide
occupational defense would be the only available defense.8 6  If the
employer was only allowed the bona fide occupational defense, the
employer would be required to present evidence showing that the
excluded class was unable to perform the duties of that particular
job.87
81. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1984),
reh'g denied, 732 F.2d 944 (1984); see Wright, 697 F.2d at 1190.
82. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1189-90. Upon remand, the district court imple-
mented the disparate impact/business necessity analysis and foundthat because
Olin had considered, but rejected other alternatives for protecting the fertile
women, the plaintiff failed to rebut the employer's business necessity defense.
Wright v. Olin Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D.N.C.), vacated, 767 F.2d 915 (4th
Cir. 1984). The district court concluded: "An employer such as Olin can
justifiably choose a policy of fetal protection as a moral obligation to protect the
next generation from injury, and it is a social good that should be encouraged
and not penalized." Id. at 1453.
83. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
84. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548.
85. Id.
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The Hayes Court ruled that the hospital's policy clearly had a
disproportionate impact on female employees.88 It would, however,
only allow the business necessity defense to be used based upon a
genuine desire to promote fetal health. 9 In rejecting the hospital's
contention that potential liability could form the basis of a business
necessity defense, the Court stated "potential liability is too contingent
and too broad a factor to amount to a business necessity.9' The Court
held that the employer had not met its burden of proof because of
inconsistency between the hospital's desire to avoid perceived potential
liabilities and the genuine concerns for the fetus.9 In addition, the
Court concluded that the employee had rebutted the business necessity
defense because the hospital had failed to consider acceptable alterna-
tives which would have minimized radiation exposure to the pregnant
employee.
92
Following the Wright and Hayes decisions, the EEOC considered
whether the business necessity defense applies when discrimination
charges are made against an employer using a fetal protection program.
The EEOC did not endorse the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit, but did
allow that the business necessity defense could apply in these particular
types of overt discrimination cases. The EEOC did not agree that fetal
protection policies should be considered as disparate impact cases when
they clearly impacted women.
93
The Johnson Court followed the Fourth Circuit and the Eleventh
Circuit in determining that a fetal protection policy could be analyzed
under the disparate impact theory, but it went further and also
considered whether the policy could be upheld under the bona fide
occupational qualification theory.
IV. THE JOHNSON CONTROLS DECISION
The court in Johnson Controls first considered the information
submitted by the employer Johnson Controls as to the reasons for
implementing the policy which barred women with childbearing capacity
from working in high lead exposure positions. Johnson Controls had
implemented over fifteen million dollars in environmental controls at its
battery division plants which included a lead hygiene program,
88. Id. at 1549-50.
89. Id. at 1553 n.15.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1553-54.
93. Policy Statement on Reproductive and Fetal Hazards Under Title VII,
401 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 6013 (Oct. 7, 1988).
94. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1552 (1990).
[Vol. 55
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respirator program, and biological monitoring program.' s Even with
these established controls the blood lead levels could possibly exceed
thirty micrograms per deciliter which is greater than the standard set
by the Centers for Disease Control as excessive for children. The
court believed that a "[piroper analysis of the Title VII issues [which]
this case presents require[s] a thorough understanding of the following
fundamental question: Does lead pose a health risk to the offspring of
Johnson's female employees?"'  The record presented to the court
established that there was clearly a substantial risk of harm to the
fetuse and that "once lead is deposited in a mother's blood, it crosses
the placenta and affects her unborn child... which is medically judged
to be at least as sensitive, and, indeed, is probably even more sensitive
to lead than the young child."''
The court noted that the Centers for Disease Control had taken the
position that "[t]he prevention of lead exposure to the fetus needs
special emphasis. Women of childbearing age should be excluded from
working at jobs where significant lead exposure occurs." 0 Evidence
submitted showed that lead accumulates and is stored in the body
following exposure and thus even a woman who was not continually
exposed to lead could conceivably expose future offspring3'° After
reviewing the evidence before it the court held that "[t]he overwhelming
evidence in this record establishes that an unborn child's exposure to
lead creates a substantial health risk ... [which] clearly approaches a
'general consensus within the scientific community." 02
Once the court found that there was a significant scientific risk to
the unborn child it determined the applicable legal standard. The court
considered the Fourth Circuit decision in Wright103 and the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Hayes1°4 in which both courts, although through
different reasoning, determined that a disparate impact/business
necessity theory was available for use in a fetal protection policy case
providing there was a substantial risk of injury to the fetus and that the
95. Id. at 875.
96. Id. at 876 n.7.
97. Td. at 879.
98. Id.
99. Id (quoting from the affidavit of J. Julian Chisholm, M.D.).
100. Id. at 880 (quoting CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTmENT
OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, PREVENTING LEAD POISONING IN YOUNG
CHILDREN 7, 20, 21 (1985)).
101. Id at 882.
102. Id. at 883 (quoting Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1191 (4th Cir.
1982)).
103. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
1990]
15
Auman: Auman: Excluding Women from the Workplace
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
transmission occurred only through women.10 5  In addition, the
Johnson Controls Court believed it had further support for the use of
the disparate impact/business necessity theory since the EEOC0 6 had
endorsed the approaches taken by the Fourth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits. 10 7  The Johnson Court believed that the requirements
providing that there be a substantial health risk to the unborn child,
that the risk be confined to female employees, and that the employee be
allowed to present less discriminatory alternatives would provide
adequate protection from the "'[m]yths or purely habitual assumptions'
that employers sometimes attempt to impermissibly utilize to support
the exclusion of women from employment opportunities." l"s The
Court, therefore, agreed with the "Fourth Circuit, Eleventh Circuit, and
the EEOC that the business necessity defense [could] appropriately [be]
applied to fetal protection policy cases under Title VII."'"
The issue before the court was to determine whether the district
court erred in granting summary judgment. First, the court noted that
summary judgment is mandated only "after adequate time for discovery
and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which the party will bear the burden [of] proof at trial."110 It
then determined that, based upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,"' the plaintiff had the burden of
105. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
106. The EEOC is the agency responsible for the administration of Title VII.
107. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Policy Statement on
Reproductive and Fetal Hazards Under Title VII, 401 Fair Empl. Prac. Man.
(BNA) 6013 (Oct. 7, 1988):
Although the BFOQ defense is normally the only one available in
cases of overt discrimination, the Commission follows the lead of every
court of appeals to have addressed the question [in determining] that
the business necessity defense applied to these cases. While business
necessity has traditionally been limited to disparate impact cases,
there is an argument that in this narrow class of cases the defense
should be flexibly applied.
Id. at 1 6014-15 (quoted in Johnson, 886 F.2d at 886).
108. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 886 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)).
109. Id. at 887.
110. Id. at 888 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
(1986)).
111. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). The Atonio Court stated:
The employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a business
justification for his employment practice. The burden of persuasion,
however, remains with the disparate-impact plaintiff.... This rule
conforms with the usual method for allocating persuasion and
[Vol. 55
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persuasion." 2 Once the burden of persuasion had been allocated, the
Court addressed the issue of whether UAW had "presented evidence
sufficient to permit the district court to conclude that Johnson Controls'
business necessity defense [could not] be factually supported."113
A. Business Necessity Defense
The Court used the test set forth in the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits to analyze whether UAW had met its burden to dispute
Johnson Controls' business necessity defense:
the employer must show (1) that there is a substantial risk of harm
to the fetus or potential offspring of women employees from the
women's exposure, either during pregnancy or while fertile, to toxic
hazards in the workplace and (2) that the hazard applies to fertile or
pregnant women, but not to men.
114
Meeting the first part of the test was relatively easy. The Court
found that both UAW and Johnson Controls agreed that there was a
substantial risk of harm to the unborn child of a female worker exposed
to lead and that the record presented to the court provided that
overwhelming medical and scientific research demonstrated a substan-
tial risk of harm." 5 The Court stated "it is not necessary to prove the
existence of a general consensus on the [issue of fetal safety] within the
qualified scientific community.""16 Instead, all that the employer must
show "is so considerable a body of opinion that significant risk exists.
. . that an informed employer could not responsibly fail to act on the
assumption that this opinion might be the accurate one."" 7 Therefore,
Johnson Controls met this component of the test and there was "no
genuine issue of material fact with respect to this [first] com-
ponent."
11
production burdens in Federal courts .... and more specifically, it
conforms to the rule in disparate-treatment cases that the plaintiff
bears the burden of disproving an employer's assertion that the
adverse employment action or practice was based solely on a legiti-
mate neutral consideration.
Id at 2126.
112. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 888.
113. Id
114. Id. at 885 (quoting Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543,
1548 (11th Cir. 1984)).
115. Id- at 888.
116. Id. (quoting Wright, 697 F.2d at 1191).
117. Id at 888-89 (quoting Wright, 697 F.2d at 1191).
118. Id at 889.
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Meeting the second part of the test required fetal exposure
transmitted only through women, and required much more consideration
by the court. Again, the Court noted that it was not necessary to show
a general consensus in the scientific community. The Court stated that
"UAW witnesses posited that animal studies had demonstrated that
there was a possible risk of genetic damage to human offspring as a
result of male lead exposure."" 9 The Court, however, discounted those
studies because the record was devoid of human studies documenting
genetic defects which resulted from male's exposure to lead. 2
Johnson Controls' experts "testified that a male worker's exposure
[to much higher amounts of lead] did not pose a substantial risk of
genetically transmitted harm from the male to the unborn child." '12 1
The Court decided that the animal research evidence was not the "type
of solid scientific data necessary for a reasonable factfinder to reach a
non-speculative conclusion that a father's exposure to lead presents the
same danger to the unborn child as that resulting from a female
employee's exposure to lead."1' Thus, Johnson Controls had met the
two prong test upholding its use of the business necessity defense for its
fetal protection policy and UAW had failed to present facts sufficient to
dispute the validity of the policy."
Once the court finds that the evidence presented supports the fetal
protection policy, the complainant may rebut the evidence by showing
"there are acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better
accomplish the business purpose ... [of protecting against the risk of
harm], or accomplish equally well with a lesser differential... impact
[between women and men workers]."" In the instant case UAW had
failed to preserve the issue for appeal. The Court noted, however, that
even if UAW had preserved the issue for appeal, it "would be con-
strained to hold that the UAW failed to present facts sufficient.., to
conclude that less discriminatory alternatives would equally effectively
achieve [the] employer's legitimate purpose of protecting unborn
children from the substantial risk of harm lead exposure creates, '0 25




122. Id at 889-90. The Johnson Controls Court did not define the term "the
same danger." We are therefore left to speculate on whether this means an
"equally substantial danger" or literally "the same" danger.
123. Id at 892-93.
124. Id. at 891 (quoting Wright, 697 F.2d at 1191 (quoting Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971))).
125. Id. at 891.
126. Id at 892.
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B. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense (BFOQ)
After determining that the business necessity defense was available
to shield Johnson Controls fetal protection policy from liability for sex
discrimination under Title VII, the Court proceeded to determine
whether the policy could be upheld under the bona fide occupational
qualification defense. 7
The Seventh Circuit had recently addressed the use of a BFOQ
defense in Torres v. Wisconsin Deptartment of Health & Social Servic-
es,12 and used that case to analyze whether the defense was applica-
ble in this present case. The Court had set forth a method for determin-
ing whether a BFOQ was valid: (1) it must focus on the particular
business of the employer as it relates to other operations in the same
business; (2) it must determine whether the goal of the employer was
part of the essence of the business; and (3) it must determine whether
the proposed BFOQ is necessary to further the goal."2
First, the Court determined that Johnson's business was "'unique'
because it require[d] the use of lead, an extremely toxic substance that
has been scientifically established to pose very serious dangers to young
children, and, in particular, to the offspring of female employees."" °
The Court then established that "safety (preventing hazards to health)
is legitimately part of the 'essence' of ihe 'business' of a battery
manufacturer."'131  Next it considered whether the fetal protection
policy was "'directly related' to industrial safety' 132 and determined
that a policy protecting unborn children from permanent impairment
resulting from exposure to the lead was indeed directly related to
industrial safety.3'
At this point, the Court addressed what it considered to be the most
difficult question; That is "whether the proposed BFOQ [was] 'reason-
ably necessary' to [further] the objective of' industrial safety. 34 In
resolving this question the Court reviewed the Title VII requirement
that substantially all women be unable to perform the duties of the
127. Id- at 893. The Seventh Circuit considered the BFOQ defense on its
own as a means of justifying the employer's exclusionary policy.
128. 859 F.2d 1523, 1527-28, 1533 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (the BFOQ
defense was available to the department; its policy excluding men from guard
positions in the living and hygiene areas of a women's prison was upheld).
129. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 894-96.




134. Id. (quoting Torres, 859 F.2d at 1530).
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job' - in light of Dothard v. Rawlinson." In Dothard the Supreme
Court had stated "more is at stake in this case, however, than an
individual woman's decision to weigh and accept the risks of employ-
ment., 137 The Johnson Court decided that, like Dothard, more was at
stake in this case because a woman might discount the risk hoping that
her infant would not be affected by the exposure. If injury then
occurred to the infant, society would have to share the risks in the form
of financial programs for the children born with physical and mental
handicaps because of exposure to lead.13 Therefore, the Court
determined that Dothard supported, rather than denied, "a conclusion
that an employer's fetal protection policy constitutes a bona fide
occupational qualification."139 The Court then ruled that Johnson
Controls had met its burden to demonstrate that the policy is reason-
ably necessary to further its objective of industrial safety. 40
Once the Court worked through this analysis it proclaimed "there
can be no doubt that the exclusion of women who are actually pregnant
from positions involving high levels of lead exposure sets forth a bona
fide occupational qualification."' Furthermore, "Johnson Controls'
well reasoned and scientifically documented decision to apply this policy
to all fertile women employed in high lead exposure positions constitutes
a bona fide occupational qualification.' 42
The Court concluded by affirming the summary judgment in favor
of Johnson Controls. After reviewing this case the Court believed the
business necessity defense should be applicable to a challenged fetal
protection policy under Title VII. In this case, UAW had failed to meet
its burden to defeat the defense. Furthermore, based upon the evidence
submitted by Johnson Controls, the Court believed that the fetal
135. Whether Johnson Controls "had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a
factual basis for believing that all or substantially all [women capable of
pregnancy] would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the
job involved." Id at 897 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333
(1977) (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th
Cir. 1969))).
136. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). The Court determined that a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification excluding women from positions in a maximum security male
prison was justified because a woman's sex could create a risk of sexual assaults
which would undermine prison security. The female's sex would "directly
undermine her capacity to provide the security that is the essence of a
correctional counselor's responsibility." Id at 336.
137. Id at 335.
138. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 897-98.
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protection policy was reasonably necessary to industrial safety and thus
could be upheld even if the bona fide occupational qualification defense
was applied to this mattr.14'
V. ANALYSIS
One of the primary purposes of Title VII, and the Pregnancy
Amendment to it, was to protect women from exclusionary policies
instituted by employers which force women to remain in low paying,
traditional jobs. Prior to Title VII women were often "protected" from
the hazards of work1 " based upon the mistaken assumption that
because of a woman's childbearing capacity she was unfit for certain
types of jobs. These jobs were often the traditional male, blue-collar
type jobs. 14  In 1908 the Supreme Court, in Muller v. Oregon,14 1
upheld a limitation on the work hours of women based upon the belief
that "healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, [and] the
physical well-being of [the] woman becomes an object of public interest
and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race."'
147
In Muller, the Court noted that the restrictions were not solely for the
benefit of the woman, but rather "for the benefit of all."14
143. Id at 901.
144. See, e.g., J. BAER, THE CHAINs OF PROTECTION (1978), in which the
author notes that women were prohibited from entering certain occupations such
as mining, smelting, bartending or even working in places where liquor was
served, and jobs which required the cleaning of moving machinery. Id. at 31.
Many laws limited the number of hours a woman could work or the amount of
weight she could lift in certain establishments such as "manufacturing,
mechanical and mercantile establishments, hotels, and restaurants." Id at 54.
The result of these laws made it much more beneficial for employers to hire men
because they could work longer hours. Often the laws made it illegal for women
to work at night. Id at 79-88.
However, as noted by J. STELIVIAN, WOMEN'S WORK, WOMEN'S HEALTH
(1977), this legislation is contradictory because "with hardly an exception, the
restrictions against lifting heavy weights and night hours of work excluded
coverage for those very jobs in which women were essential and needed
protection. Hospital workers were permitted to work at night, and waitresses
were allowed to lift heavy trays." Id. at 176-77.
145. See, e.g, J. STELLMAN, supra note 144; Becker, supra note 16.
146. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
147. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421 (upholding an Oregon statute prohibiting the
employment of any woman for more than ten hours a day in any mechanical
establishment, factory or laundry).
148. Id. at 422. The Court further expressed the belief that a woman's
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Congress essentially overruled Muller when it passed the Pregnan-
cy Amendment to Title VII, and federal and state court decisions have
reached the same result in invalidating protective labor laws which
prohibit women from working in particular jobs or limit women in other
ways. 49 The Fifth Circuit in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 160 made the following statement:
Title VII rejects ... romantic paternalism as unduly Victorian and
instead vests individual women with the power to decide whether or
not to take on unromantic tasks. Men have always had the right to
determine whether the incremental increase in remuneration for
strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, boring or unromantic tasks is worth
the candle. The promise of Title VII is that women are now to be on
equal footing.151
This means that if men are permitted to assume the risks of employ-
ment in an unhealthy environment, women should be, and are to be,
allowed that same right.'52
The Johnson Controls Court appears to endorse the idea that an
employer may promulgate an exclusionary policy which limits women's
employment opportunities without allowing the women involved the
same right as a man in deciding whether to assume the risk of
employment in an unhealthy environment. The court, and the
employers who promulgate these policies, are in essence asserting that
the interests of the potential fetus rank above those of the moth-
er/worker and that this limitation on women is a small price for women
to pay. The court, in upholding, and the employer, in promulgating the
exclusionary policy, are informing women that they are not competent
It should be noted that during this period of time no state passed a statute
banning women from working more than 10 hours in any job that women
traditionally held, such as hospital workers. See supra notes 144-45 and
accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Krause v. Sacramento Inn, 479 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1973) (job
prohibition law); Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa.
1971) (hours law), affd, 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); Ridinger v. General Motors
Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (job prohibition, weight and hour
laws), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972).
150. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
151. Id. at 236.
152. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), where the Court stated
that "the argument that a particular job is too dangerous for women may
appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow
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to make the necessary decisions relating to their employment and
health.15
In Johnson Controls, the employer's primary concern was "protect-
ing pregnant women and their unborn children from dangerous blood
lead levels."'154 The court first established that industrial safety and
protecting its workers was indeed a legitimate part of the business of
any manufacturing enterprise. The court then believed that it was a
logical step to say that a policy protecting the unborn children of its
workers from exposure to toxic chemicals directly relates to industrial
safety and is therefore a legitimate part of the business.
Men, however, presumably make up the majority of the company's
workers and yet the company's policy protected only pregnant women
and their unborn children. The policy makes no mention of the
protection of the unborn children of men. If protecting the unborn
children of its workers is indeed related to industrial safety, the policy
should also include men and their unborn children.
A. Use of the Business Necessity Defense
Although application of the business necessity defense to fetal
protection policies is relatively new, the court adopts the Wright-
Hayes'55 approach allowing use of the defense in the narrow class of
cases which relate to fetal protection policies. The dissenting opinions
did not agree that the business necessity defense applied to these cases,
stating at one point "[I]t is unfortunate that the majority gives a new
life of sorts to the result-oriented gimmickry of Wright v. Olson
Corp.'1  The dissenting judges further noted that the statute only
153. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871. In Johnson Controls, the
majority opinion stated "it would not be improbable that a female employee
might somehow rationally discount this clear risk in her hope and belief that her
infant would not be adversely affected from lead exposure." Id at 897.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Posner stated "There are plenty of selfish
and irresponsible parents, not all of whom are male. A fetal protection policy
is less paternalistic than a maximum-hours law." Id at 906 (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
It should be noted that Judge Easterbrook, dissenting, did not agree with
the majority or Judge Posner. He noted: "Such laws (i.e., protective legislation]
also treat women in a stereotypical way. State laws requiring or allowing
employers to treat women differently, on the assumption that women are less
able than men to take the precautions essential for healthy children, are
preempted by Title VII." Id. at 912 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
154. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 876.
155. See supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
156. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 902 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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allows use of the bona fide occupational qualification defense in cases
in which sex is the basis for exclusion. 57
The business necessity defense traditionally applies only in cases
where a policy is facially neutral, but results in a disparate impact upon
one group." The court in Johnson Controls appeared to agree with
the Wright and Hayes courts that although the fetal protection policy
looks overtly discriminatory, no theory under Title VII directly applies
to these policies. Thus, since there was no directly applicable theory and
the policy "involves motivations and consequences most closely
resembling a disparate impact case"1 9 the employer should be allowed
to justify its policy under the much broader business necessity defense.
The flaw in this analysis is that the fetal protection policy is not
facially neutral, but rather overtly discriminatory and the employer
should not be given the opportunity to defend its discriminatory practice
under the business necessity defense. Congress adopted Title VII and
the Pregnancy Amendment to protect women from discrimination based
upon childbearing capabilities. The exclusion of women from the
workplace definitely discriminates on this basis and should thus be
allowed only when there is a bona fide occupational qualification.
B. Danger of Lead Exposure to Males
No one will contradict the courts finding that lead poses a substan-
tial risk of harm to unborn children. The court, however, failed to
consider the plaintiff's evidence that male workers suffer genetic
damage which may also result in serious consequences to their
offspring.6' The court brushed aside these test results because the
data dealt with animal studies and not human studies.'6 '
The position taken by the majority is difficult to justify when the
court first accepts the OSHA standards16 2 as a basis for determining
that Johnson Controls' blood lead standard was valid and then states
that animal studies are scientifically unconvincing. OSHA's standards
are based on those very animal studies that the court brushes aside as
scientifically unconvincing as to the effects on male reproductive
risks." Furthermore, the OSHA standards state that "exposure to
lead can have serious effects on reproductive function in both males and
157. I&
158. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
159. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 884 (quoting Wright, 697 F.2d at 1186).
160. Id at 919.
161. Id at 889.
162. 29 C.F.YR § 1910 (1989).
163. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 919.
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females;"' 64 yet the court totally ignored this evidence. The court
seems to be saying that these studies are valid as they pertain to the
potential risks involved with the exposure to lead in females, but these
same tests are invalid as they relate to males.
The dissenting opinion correctly asserts that "a court [should not]
reject [animal studies], as my colleagues do, on the ground that as a
matter of law animal studies are not 'solid scientific data.'... Often
animal studies are the best foundation for decision... [and] [t]he
Supreme Court has concluded that they may be used."'" In fact most
of the information available regarding effects of toxic substances on
reproductive capacity are limited to maternal exposure, 1' and many
such tests are conducted using animals.'
67
By failing to consider the animal studies the court was able to
conclude that the exposure to the child was confined to female employ-
ees; therefore, the policy met the second element of the business
necessity defense. Had the court considered these tests it may not have
found that women were the only source for exposure to the unborn child.
After this decision it may be possible that only women will be singled
out to protect future offspring, when men may actually be subjecting
their future offspring to equally hazardous risks. Or perhaps it may
enable a plaintiff to argue that the first element cannot be met because
animal tests are too speculative to base a decision regarding whether
there is substantial risk of harm to a fetus from either sex.
C. Less Discriminatory Alternative
The plaintiffs failed to respond to the employer's contention that
there were no less discriminatory alternatives, thus the issue was not
164. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1989) (emphasis added).
In male workers exposed to lead there can be a... decreased ability
to produce healthy sperm, and sterility .... Malformed sperm
(teratospermia), decreased number of sperm (hypospermia), and sperm
with decreased motility (asthenospermia) can all occur.... Germ
cells can be affected by lead and cause genetic damage in the egg or
sperm cells before conception and result in failure to implant,
miscarriage, stillbirth, or birth defects.
165. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 919 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citing
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(upholding the use of animal studies to formulate a decision)).
166. See Williams, supra note 11, at 658.
167. The EPA has stated in its Reproduction and Fertility Testing
Guidelines that "the test substance is to be administered to ... animals [and
that] the rat is the preferred species." 40 C.F.R. § 798.4700(b), (c) (1989).
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preserved for appeal." s  As the court noted, the plaintiff has the
burden of showing that "less discriminatory alternatives would equally
effectively achieve an employer's legitimate purpose of protecting unborn
children."'69 Because the plaintiffs failed to preserve this issue, and
failed to even address the issue, they failed to meet their burden. The
court pointed out, however, that it may very well have been able to
reach a different conclusion had the plaintiffs actually presented
evidence of less discriminatory alternatives.
170
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Easterbrook believes that when
stated the policy reveals "many less stringent options that might be
almost as good at protecting interests of children.'' 171 For instance,
the policy forbids all women with childbearing capacity from working in
the area; however, some women with childbearing capacity are less
likely to become pregnant than others. For instance, "[w]omen over 40
rarely have children,"'72 a woman who is widowed or divorced may not
be as likely to become pregnant, a woman's husband may be sterile
which would decrease her chances of pregnancy, or the woman may be
taking birth control pills. A policy which did not exclude these women
from the work area would be less stringent and still fulfill the em-
ployer's goal of protecting future offspring. The requirement is not that
there be zero risk, but rather that there be an alternative which is less
discriminatory.
17 3
The plaintiff has the burden of showing that there are other less
discriminatory alternatives. In this case the plaintiffs failure to argue
that the employer could instigate other, less discriminatory, alternatives
was fatal; thus the court was in a position to uphold the employer's
policy as legitimately based upon a business necessity. It is apparent
from this decision that the plaintiff must always address the issue as to
less discriminatory alternatives to the exclusionary policy or risk
summary judgment of the claim.
168. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 891.
169. Id
170. Id. at 890.
171. Id at 919. See, e.g., Comment, Fetal Protection Programs Under Title
WI-Rebutting the Procreation Presumption, 46 U. PA. L. REv. 755 (1985), in
which the author stated, "These policies are ... over inclusive and paternalis-
tic.... By covering all fertile women without respect to marital status, sexual
activity, use of contraception, or fertility of the sexual partner, fetal protection
programs assume that women cannot be trusted to act responsibly." Id. at 764
(footnote excluded).
172. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 919.
173. Id. at 919.
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D. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's Position
Although the EEOC has accepted the Wright-Hayes analytical
framework for use in disparate impact cases relating to fetal protection
policies,"' in a recent ruling17 5 the EEOC refused to endorse the
Johnson decision and will not rely on it for other fetal protection
discrimination claims. In the ruling the EEOC clarified its position as
to the use of the business necessity defense when it stated "[w]e did not
mean to suggest that a fetal protection policy fits within the category of
an adverse impact case."'176 The EEOC reiterated that "policies which
exclude only women constitute per se violations of Title VII.'
71
Therefore, the Johnson Court's use of the disparate impact analysis set
forth in the Atonio decision was in error and the plaintiff should not
have to bear the burden of disproving business necessity. Rather, "the
burden is on the employer to justify its policy ... [and] the employer
must prove that the policy it has adopted to reduce risk is narrowly
tailored.,178
E. Application of the BFOQ Defense
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act'7 9 states that:
the terms because of sex or on the basis of sex include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment-related purposes... as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work.1 s
Title VII and the Pregnancy Amendment provides one exception to
this directive when it allows that:
[N]otwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees.., on the basis of... religion, sex, or national
174. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
175. EEOC Withholds Approval of Board Fetal Protection Plans, 58




179. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
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origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin
is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."'
Johnson's exclusionary policy is based on the actual ability to become
pregnant. As such, it is certainly based upon sex. Therefore, it falls
squarely within the Act and only the BFOQ defense should be allowed.
The court believed that the BFOQ defense, if applicable to fetal
protection policy cases, would justify the policy used by Johnson
Controls. The court noted that in Dothard v. Rawlinson,5 2 the
Supreme Court had stated "discrimination based on sex is valid only
when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by not
hiring members of one sex exclusively."'"' To rely on a BFOQ
exception, the employer must prove "that he had reasons to believe, that
is a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would
be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job
involved."8
The court had a difficult time in deciding that the fetal protection
policy was reasonably necessary to further the goals of industrial safety.
It finally reached its decision through the use of a very tortured
analysis. The analysis involved a statement in Dothard that "more is
at stake in this case than an individual woman's decision to weigh and
accept the risks of employment because of her childbearing capaci-
ties.08
5
In making the decision that "more was at stake," the court
discussed three issues. First, the court noted that a woman may
discount the risk to her infant in deciding to work in the high lead area.
Second, the birth of handicapped children is a cost to society because of
government financed programs to train and care for these children.
Finally, parents may not always rely on parental rights in making
181. Id. § 2000e-2(e).
182. 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (holding that women could be excluded from
employment as guards, in a contact position, in a maximum security male prison
because of the risk of sexual assault which would undermine prison security).
183. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 894 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385,388
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971))).
184. Id. at 894 (quoting Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333 (quoting Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969))).
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act states that "women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment related purposes... as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
185. Id. at 897. In Dothard the Court found that more was at stake because
the risk of assault would undermine prison security.
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decisions which affect their children's health and well-being.'8 With
consideration of these factors it was easy for the court to determine that
"more was at stake" in this case-the safety of unborn children. Since
"more was at stake" the court felt that the employer had sufficiently
demonstrated that the policy was "reasonably necessary to further
industrial safety, [which the court had] determined to be part of the
essence of Johnson Controls' business."
18 7
The major problem with this analysis is that the company and the
court never actually addressed the issue whether there was "reasonable
cause to believe . . . that all or substantially all women capable of
pregnancy would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties
of the job involved.''88 In Dothard, the "more that was at stake"
related to job performance. A woman in a male prison may be subject
to sexual assault and, therefore, may be unable to maintain order. This
situation could pose a safety risk to others if violence broke out. Since
the safety risk would arise because of the woman's inability to perform
her job safely, the court allowed the employer to use the policy even
though it did result in sex discrimination. "The more that is at stake"
in Johnson is not related-even remotely-to job performance or an
inability to perform the job safely. Johnson Controls' policy purportedly
is based on the employer's concern for future generations; this objective
is not at all concerned with the making of batteries. The women
involved did work in the high lead areas until 1982, presumably
performing their duties safely and efficiently.
The dissenting judges 89 in Johnson Controls agree that the
BFOQ defense is appropriate for these cases. In addition, the judges
note that to meet the defense's criteria "the employer must demonstrate
'a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all women would
be unable to perform safely ... and efficiently the duties of the job
involved."'"' 0 They do not agree, however, on the ultimate out-
come.
19 1
Judges Posner and Cudahy, dissenting, would remand for a full
trial to provide the employer with an opportunity to try to prove that it
has a valid BFOQ defense. Both believe that it may be difficult, but not
totally impossible to prove a BFOQ defense for fetal policies, but that it
is a mistake to affirm the summary judgment without a full trial. In
addition, both believe that the BFOQ defense should not be construed
so narrowly as to preclude the employer from considering ethical, legal,
186. Id. at 897-98.
187. Id. at 898.
188. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333; see supra notes 52, 183.
189. Cudahy, Posner, Easterbrook, and Flaum.
190. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 902 n.1.
191. Id. at 901-21.
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and business concerns about the effects of an employer's activities on
third parties.'9 2 Judges Easterbrook and Flaum, also dissenting,
believe that the BFOQ defense requirements could not be met in this
case and that the court erred in granting summary judgment using the
Wright-Hayes approach to business necessity.
F. Summary Judgment Proceedings
By allowing this policy to be upheld in a summary judgment
proceeding the court essentially has expanded the business necessity
defense and the bona fide occupational qualification defense without
allowing for complete consideration of the issues in a trial. The Hayes-
Wright business necessity defense has been given further support.
Thus, if an employer can show that substantial fetal harm will result
from maternal, as opposed to paternal exposure, the defense will be
upheld absent proof of a less discriminatory alternative. This should
serve as a warning to all future plaintiffs to address the issue of a less
discriminatory alternative or possibly risk losing their claim in a
summary judgment proceeding.'9 3
The employer is not unjustified in expressing concern over the
potential costs involved should a child actually be harmed by the toxic
chemicals. Future litigation could result"M in the employer being sued
by the child who is injured from toxic chemicals which are introduced
into the mother's system during or prior to pregnancy.9 5 The
employer is thus placed between the proverbial "rock and a hard place."
The employer must allow equal employment opportunity for women,
protect its employees from health hazards, and deal with the issue of
future liability should fetal injury actually occur. Title VII does not
require a company to totally ignore social and economic costs providing
they actually are "reasonably necessary to the normal (civilized,
humane, prudent, ethical) operation of [that] particular business."'"
192. Id. at 904.
193. Id. at 901-21.
194. Judge Posner, dissenting, stated: "[1It is difficult to estimate Johnson
Controls' exposure to tort liability, but it would be premature, in this age of
mass-tort suites (which for example drove the asbestos industry into bankrupt-
cy), to dismiss it as trivial." Id at 905 (Posner, J., dissenting).
195. Judge Posner, dissenting, noted that one tort suit against a battery
manufacturer had been brought for lead injury to a child. Id. In Security Natl
Bank v. Chloride, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 294 (D. Kan. 1985), the plaintiff got to a
jury on the issue, but the verdict was fo the defense. Johnson Controls, 886
F.2d at 905.
196. Id- at 906.
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It may be that at some point these social costs will actually impede the
company's manufacturing process, but that issue should be left to a
reasonable fact-finder's determination, not decided in a summary
judgment proceeding.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Johnson Court addressed the question whether an employer's
fetal protection policy may be upheld even if it results in employment
discrimination. The court upheld the policy using both the business
necessity defense for disparate impact cases and the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification defense. The business necessity defense may have
been upheld simply because the plaintiff failed to rebut the employer's
contention that there were no less discriminatory alternatives. Or, it
possibly was upheld because the plaintiff did not present evidence of
non-animal tests showing that male workers' exposure to lead also could
result in fetal injury. It is apparent, however, that the Seventh Circuit
considers the test set forth in the Hayes and Wright decisions to be valid
in determining whether an employer's fetal protection policy is to be
upheld despite the fact that the policy is overtly discriminatory and
clearly not facially neutral.
The court was correct in using the BFOQ analysis as mandated by
the Pregnancy Act. The court, however, misapplied the test when it
upheld the BFOQ defense to recognize concern for fetal safety. The
court ignored the mandates of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by
allowing use of the BFOQ defense in this case.
Historically, protective legislation was based upon the idea that
something "more was at stake" than simply a woman's decision to work.
This "something more" always related to childbearing capabilities or
protection of the woman from some anticipated harm.'97 Title VII and
the Pregnancy Act were designed to prevent this type of discrimination
except when the childbearing ability directly affects the woman's ability
to perform the task.
198
The court has undermined the purpose of Title VII by allowing this
"something more" to be related strictly to childbearing capacity. Title
VII was designed to prevent employment policies which deprive women
of opportunities to compete on an equal basis with men. By ignoring
the Pregnancy Act and its directives, the court provides an open door in
which policies may be developed that will affect women in their future
employment opportunities.
It is difficult to think of a case where we could not find "something
more at stake" whenever operating a business poses a danger to third
197. See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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persons. This especially is true since the court has determined that the
manufacture of batteries is unique because it uses a highly toxic
substance. This reasoning may enable any employer using toxic
substances to claim it has a unique type of business and, therefore, it
qualifies to use the BFOQ defense to exclude women from the workplace
based upon fetal concerns. This is a definite diversion from the BFOQ
defense set out by Congress as it relates to the Pregnancy Amendment.
As more chemicals and toxic substances are tested for their effects
upon reproductive capabilities and fetal damage, 199 it will probably
become easier for the employer to show fetal risk. It is apparent from
the Johnson decision that wherever there is fetal risk there will be the
"something more" necessary to enable the employer to use the BFOQ
defense.
This issue merits careful consideration by the Supreme Court. This
is especially true in light of the EEOC's recent statement that the court
used the disparate impact analysis when it should have used the
disparate treatment analysis in requiring the plaintiff to disprove the
business necessity defense. It seems apparent that the case should not
have been decided in a summary judgment proceeding. The issue needs
to be resolved, if not by the Supreme Court then by Congress, because
it is one of great concern for all members of society.
Fetal safety is a valid concern for the employer, the parent, and the
government. Nevertheless, this concern should be weighed in light of
the costs being borne by women and their dependents because sex-
specific policies, no matter how reasonable, result in a disadvantage for
women in the workplace. If Congress and society as a whole, believe
that to minimize birth defects employers should be allowed to exclude
women in cases where fetal hazards exist, then Congress could create
a narrow defense to protect employers from discrimination challenges.
Until the Supreme Court or Congress addresses this issue, employers
should not be allowed to make decisions that affect women on such a
personal level. Women, rather than the court or their employers, should
be regarded as the most competent to make decisions regarding
employment risks. The courts should not be left to resolve this issue on
a case-by-case basis.
EVA M. AUMAN
199. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 25,714 (1989). E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Company is conducting tests regarding the effects of Hexafluoropropene on the
ovaries of hamsters, the mutagenicity of hexafluoropropylene and the mutagenic-
ity of vinyl fluoride. Id,
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